The Legitimate government in Hawaii Series: Exposing the Enemy of U.S. President Cleveland - Pirate William P. Frye
Review by Amelia G (2022)
”William Pierce Frye served as a Senator from Maine for a period of thirty years, 1881=1911. During this time the United States passed from a nation still binding the wounds of the Civil War to a nation which achieved the status of a world power. Frye was an active participant in this growth and as much as any single individual, symbolized the United States of this period.”
William P. Fryes name appeared in an important article of U.S. President Cleveland who recognized the Kingdom of Hawaii /Hawaiian Kingdom as the Legitimate Royal government:
The Legitimate government in Hawaii Series: President Cleveland Recognized the Royal government as Legitimate Not the Usurpers! - Evidence
Reviewed by Amelia Gora (2022)
From the above website by Ronald Banks:
”reason must be mentioned. In 1890, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote a book entitled, The Influence of Seapower Upon History. It was Mahaa's contention that to be an economically secure country, like Great Britain, a nation must develop a large and powerful navy. Sea power existed to protect commerce in time of peace and war. The navy would keep trade routes open and protect coaling and way stations along the trading lanes. But America had no merchant marine to protect and had there been any, there was only a pathetically anemic navy to protect i ^ Frye was greatly influenced by the Admiral's thesis as were many Americans. However, that the writings of Mahan were the determining factor behind Frye's expansionism can be easily refuted. As early as 1888, two years before Mahan's classic, Frye showed his imperialist hand when he became alarmed at German overtures in the Pacific archipelago of Samoa. Before the Apia incident had brought the situation to a head, Frye recommended that the United States display herrpower 5 as a country by sending war ships to protect its interests. Later, as the situation became explosive, he expressed views which portented the expansionist fervor ten years hence. "It (Pago Pago) is the best harbor in the Pacific Ocean, right in the hurricane latitude, and it is absolutely necessary if we have vessels in that ocean that we can have the right of harborage in Pago Pago - absolutely necessary 1— - If the Nicaraguan Canal is built -- Samoa is of infinitely greater li. Julius Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore! Johns-Hopkins Press, 1926), pp. 1-20. 5. Cong. P-ec., 50 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 108. 68 importance to our interests than the Sandwich Islands... ."^ While this aggressive tone was more justified than in the fisheries controversy, Frye omitted humanitarian justification for maintaining American rights in Pago Pago; the economic considerations were paramount. Pago Pago was a coaling station and, true to Mahanism, coaling stations were vital possessions in order to supply American merchant vessels and the navy, however inadequate both were. More significant than Samoa to the expansionist crusade was American interest in Hawaii. For decades a small group of Americans had been steadily increasing their control over the islands until in the 1880's over two-thirds of the total taxable real estate of the Hawaiian 7 Islands was in American hands. In 1875, Congress had approved a re cip ro city treaty with Hawaii whereby sugar was allowed to come into the United State s a t an advantage over Cuban and Louisiana sugar. This accelerated a boom in the islan d s so th a t by 1890, three-fourths o f Hawaiian imports came from the United S ta te s and ninety-nine per cent o f her exports were absorbed by the United S ta te s . This gave Hawaii a very favorable balance of trade re su ltin g in the accumulation o f surplus c a p ita l. Haw aii's phenomenal prosperity, however, depended on the Q United States and its favorable reciprocity arrangement. In 1890, Frye supported the McKinley Tariff which allowed all sugar to enter the United States free of duty and gave Louisiana sugar growers a two cent per pound bounty. Hawaii was forced to compete with 6. Ibid., p. 137k. 7. Bailey, o£. cit., p. U69. 8. Pratt, 0£. cit., p. ll(.7. 69 Cuban and American grown sugar causing serious economic dislocations in the islands as their exports nosedived. Property in Hawaii depreciated mare than $12,000,000. One solution to this economic disaster was annexation by the United States so that Hawaii could also receive the sugar bounty. The allegation that American sugar interests incited the eventual revolution in 1893 often has been voiced. Actually opinion among the sugar planters was sharply divided because annexation by the United States would mean the exclusion of Oriental labor upon which the in9 dustry depended. The real reasons, it can be safely concluded, were due to the material benefits expected from annexation, plus the desire 10 to oust the unstable government of Queen Liluiokalani. On January lit, 1893, the Queen promulgated a new constitution highly unfavorable to American interests. Anticipating the Queen's move, her enemies had organized a revolutionary movement which had the support of the United States Minister to Hawaii, John L. Stevens. On January 16, Stevens, at the request of the pro-annexationists, ordered more than 150 armed men from the U.S.S. Boston to protect American property in the islands, and on January 17, he recognized the revolutionary government which had been so weak as to need his assistance. Two weeks later, Stevens proclaimed Hawaii a protectorate and advised the State Department to act quickly lest Great Britain annex the islands. Shortly thereafter, a hastily prepared treaty for annexation 9. Ibid., pp. 156-137. 10. Ibid., p. 160. 70 was submitted to the Senate.1-*- However, the Senate heeded Cleveland's request for delay and took no action prior to March It, 1893. Cleveland, after becoming President for the second time, was extremely suspicious of the conduct of Minister Stevens concerning the revolution. Accordingly, on March 9, 1893, he withdrew the treaty from the Senate and promptly appointed James Blount as an official commissioner with "paramount authority" to visit the islands and investigate the entire situation. When Blount arrived in Hawaii, he proceeded to lower the -American flag over the government house and to dismiss the military who had been ordered ashore by Stevens. His position repudiated, Stevens re12 signed in disgust and was succeeded by Blount. John Stevens was a Maine man. He had been co-editor of the Kennebec Journal with James G. Blaine and followed Blaine to Washington where the latter secured Stevens' appointment as Minister to Hawaii,in 13 1889. Being closely connected with Blaine throughout his career, Stevens shared Blaine's philosophy of expansion. It is little wonder that Cleveland's repudiation of him was taken as a repudiation of expansionism in general, and Maine's pride in her public servants in particular. Blount's final report charged Stevens of improperly aiding the revolution and concluded that the revolution would not have material11. Bailey, 0£. cit., pp. Ii69-U71. 12. Ibid., p. 131. 13. Thomas Spaulding, D.A.B., Vol. 17, p. 619 71 ized without his aid.l^ As if a portent of what was to come, Frye's home-town newspaper viciously attacked Blount and his report as being in a "league with Spreckles", and earlier the Kennebec Journal, true to its former editor, pronounced Blount a liar and described l£ Stevens as a great man who also was a "true, tried and tested American'.' It is interesting to note that while Blount's report was being discussed, the Journal carried full texts of all of Stevens' addresses, some delivered as far away as Chicago. Stevens had been carrying on a campaign of vindication and had addressed many pro-annexationists groups in the East. A New fork newspaper carried a story which alleged that Senators Hale, Aldrich, and Frye owned Hawaiian bonds and therefore had a 17 monetary interest in annexation. This accusation was alarming to Frye and when the Blount report reached the Senate, Frye not only supported Stevens' position by describing him as a man "of the highest -l Q character," 1 but found it necessary to clear himself of any ulterior motives for his support of Stevens. At one stage of the debate, as if defending himself as well as his friend Stevens, Frye vehemently denied that Stevens would incite a revolution and protested the Democratic assertions to that effect. After one of Frye's remarks, Senator West lit. Pratt, o£. cit., pp. 135-137. 15. Lewiston Journal, Nov. 21, 1893, p. 1. 16. K.J., Nov. 21, 1893. 17. Matilda Gresham, The Life and Times of Walter Q. Gresham (New York: Rand McNally and C0 ., 1919), Vol. II, p. 773. Frye was extremely upset by this report. The author has found no evidence either confirming or denying this allegation. 18. Cong. Rec., 53 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 72. 72 from Missouri responded that he would sooner trust a hungry wolf "when the bleat of a farmer's lamb is heard than Senator Frye. With all his generous instincts it is impossible for him to be anything else but an intense New England Republican. Like his friend, Mr. Stevens, his whole political action is governed by the great truth that the earth belongs to the saints, and we are saints."^ Apparently such verbal attacks bothered Frye little. Shortly afterward he accused Blount of not writing one line of "plain, untarnished truth" in his report, and reiterated that Stevens was unques20 m tionably innocent of any ulterior motives. Tempers and emotions had become so aroused that the Kennebec Journal claimed that Frye's rather unoriginal assessment of Blount's report would "live in history” as it 21 cut to the truth like a skilled surgeon. On December 27, 1893, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began an investigation to ascertain whether there were irregularities in Stevens' behavior or in Blount's report. A subcommittee composed of Senators Frye, Morgan, Gray and Sherman worked on the project until late February I89i*. There was sharp disagreement on several important points. Senator Morgan's report exonerated everyone except Queen 22 Lili. The Republican members, including Frye, agreed with Morgan's assessment of Stevens but not his conclusions concerning Blount and 1920 19. Ibid., p. 19U. 20. K ,J ., December lU, 1893. 21. Ibid., December l5, 1893. 22. Senate Report, No. 227, 33 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 173 73 President Cleveland.^3 The other Democratic Senators dissented from Morgan's approval of Stevens' actions but approved of Blount's actions. Apparently the subcommittee's investigation and conclusions were simply perfunctory exercises confirming the members' preconceived notions and prejudices. Nothing new was revealed. Frye and his Republican colleagues based their opposition on the technicality that Blount' s appointment without the consent of the Senate was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . i n addition, they urged that the Queen 25 not be restored as Cleveland had previously suggested. Their recommendations would preserve the integrity of the provisional government and would (when the present furor subsided) leave the way open 26 for a renewal of pressure for annexation.- This resolution never came to a vote. The most important question was whether or not the United States would adopt an expansionist program. A resolution against annexation was introduced by Senator Vest of Missouri and was vehemently debated. Vest who had steadfastly opposed Frye in all of the latter's projects 27 remained equally steadfast on this issue. Frye, on the other hand, took his usual exception to his adversary's proposal and bluntly admitted that he was, "and had been always a very e m e s t annexationist pQ ..." Re maintained that the best interests of Hawaii and the United 23*5678 23. Pratt, o£. cit., p. 185. 2lw Ibid., pp. 35-36. 25. Ibid.. p. 33. 26. Ibid., p. 3k 27. Cong. Rec., 52 Uong., 1 Sess., pp. 1308-1309. 28. Ibid., p. 1308. Ik States required annexation and advocated the immediate recognition of the provisional government. "Let the Senate pass the /Frye7 resolution. Let it be sent across this continent, across the ocean, down into the paradise of the Pacific, and let the hearts of those confiding people once more be assured that they are not to be attacked by 30 the troops of their own government." As the session progressed, debate on Hawaiian annexation became intermittent and no general agreement seemed forthcoming. Late in May a breakthrough became apparent. Senator Kyle of South Dakota introduced a resolution to the effect that the United States should not use force to restore the monarchy or to maintain the provisional 31 government. To Frye and others this proposal was preferable to the restoration of the Queen. He expressed the sentiments of the annexationists when he voted for the resolution to give the Hawaiian people their "liberty of thought and action," but refused to vote for a reso32 lution which proposed that the United States would not annex Hawaii. This concluded the first political airing of the expansionist philosophy in a body not yet ready to assume the responsibilities of a colonial empire. Senator Frye was disappointed at the outcome of the treaty and looked forward to the day when annexation would be consummated. From lS9ii to 1898, Hawaii under President Dole enjoyed a great peace and 29301 29. Ibid., p. 1310. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid., p. $192. 32. Ibid., pp. £L9U-$2li7. 7 5 prosperity due to the abolition of the Louisiana sugar bounty and a 33 reversion to the favorable position she enjoyed in 1890. If a stable government was all that was desired, Hawaii had one. However, to Frye, stability meant a relatively independent citizenry of Hawaii, an independence which might lead that island into the hands of Great Britain. It is not surprising, therefore, that Frye and others would be acutely aware of any change that would endanger American interests in Hawaii. Early in January 1895, a small royalist group was apprehended and jailed by Honolulu police. The city was placed under martial law. However, when a sufficient amount of time had lapped, the provisional government saw that the severe counter measures taken by them were absurd. The prisoners were released and the island returned to norraal0 Annexationists used the "revolt" as a further excuse to beat the drums for annexation. Quotidian speeches emphasizing the seriousness of the situation were made by Frye, Lodge, and others. At Bridgeport, Connecticut, in March, 1895, Frye delivered a bombastic speech. After extolling the protective tariff and the McKinley Tariff in particular, he added his description of the glories of late nineteenth century Republicanism: "Give us Republican rule for a single decade of unlimited, uncrippled power, and we will show the people the beneficence of Republican legislation. We will annex the Hawaiian Islands, fortify Pearl Harbor, build the Nicaraguan Canal and marry too great oceans. We will show people a foreign policy that is American in every fibre and hoist the American 3 33. Pratt, 0£. cit., p. 193 76 flag on whatever island we think best, and no hand shall ever pull it d o w n . ^ American journalism would be veiy irresponsible if it allowed such jingoism to go unchallenged. One paper, a traditional foe of Frye and Imperialism, labeled Frye the spokesman for "a few men of feeble nerves and narrow imagination. The Nation brought up the embarrassing Hawaiian bond syndicate and described Frye and Senator 36 Lodge as going into a "corybantic rage" to denounce the allegation. Frye took little note of these editorial comments and extended his belligerency in an interview given a week later at Biddleford, Maine. "I would not submit to any insult, to any aggressions on our rights.... I would annex the Hawaiian Islands at once.... I would maintain our coaling stations in Pago Pago against the world... If Spain, by her actions at any time, justified us in so doing, I would seize and hold Cuba against the world. I would accept Canada and would not offer her inducements to stay away, as this last Democratic congress did. It made her a present of one million dollars annually as a bonus to remain under the protection of Great Britain, to nag, insult, and abuse us. Even if ■‘hgland forced us into another declaration of war, I would promptly seize Canada and make her forever a part of the Republic."3? This interview caused the Nation to describe Frye as being in an intoxicated mental condition, while the Independent called him a *3678 3U. N.T.T.. March 29, 189$, p. 1. 3$. Ibid., March 30, 189$, p. it. 36. Nation, January 31, 189$, p. 81. 37. Lewiston Journal, April 3, 189$, P. 1. 38. Nation, April 11, 189$, p. 269. 77 "buccaneer."39 The most bitter assailing came from the Times. It reported that Frye had startled the public and also American friends abroad. "Not that the Senator has any great reputation for wisdom, for he has not. But he has been considered to be rather more sensitive to ridicule than Boutelle (from Maine's third district) or Henry Cabot Lodge. This goes far beyond the conventional and platitudinous Frye. It out Boutelles Boutelle and out Lodges Lodge.... Lodge in. his wildest moments never went as far as this."*10 In the same article the Times compared the growing imperialistic sentiment with the Salem witchcraft hysteria and concluded, facetiously, that Frye had lost his mind. "Such talk from a man in Senator Frye's position tends to make the United States odius and ridiculous before the world. Much of the criticism of Frye had been accentuated by his resolution introduced during the height of the "royalist threat" in Hawaii, Appealing to the emotions of his colleagues, he had demanded that warships be sent to Hawaii to protect American life and property and to prevent the restoration of Queen L i l i . ^ This would, of course, violate the Vest resolution for which he voted, the resolution saying that the United States would not aid either the royalists or the provisional government of Hawaii with arms. Although the proposal was loudly denounced by the majority of the Senate, Fjye persisted, and finally accused President Cleveland and Secretary of State Gresham of 39 39. Independent, Quoted in the Nation, April 11, 1895, p. 269. bO. N.Y.T.. April 5, 1895, p. h. IfL. Ibid., p. U. h2. Cong. Rec., 53 Cong., 3 Sess., p. 1133. 78 being friendly to the Queen and wanting to restore the monarchy. Whether this was an attempt to arouse partisan clamor for annexation or a genuinely held belief is difficult to say. Whatever the reason, the Senate was not yet ready to commit itself to an unequivocable expansionist program. While the debates on the Hawaiian question continued, another equally vexatious problem was developing in Cuba. The same WilsonGorman Tariff which had returned prosperity to Hawaii in l89i*-95 had the opposite affect on the Cuban economy since it reimposed the duties of the pre-McKinley Tariff days on Cuban sugar. This caused unstable economic conditions in Cuba and led to a guerrilla uprising xdiich would ) ^ not end until the Spanish-American War. The uprising was directed against Spanish colonial rulers but American property was also destroyed^ with the intention of forcing the United States to intervene. The Committee on Foreign Relations of which Frye was a ranking member recommended that the United States recognize the Cuban insurgents.^ During the ensuing discussion, Frye approved the proposal. "I have but one desire, and that is to see Cuba an independent republic^ and whatever I can do justly and honorably to that end I am prepared to 1*3. Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit, (New York: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1951), p. 1*1*. )|)|. James T. Adams, Epic of America, (Boston: Little-Brown and Co., 1931), p. 335. 1*5. Frye had just refused the chairmanship of the committee and also had just been elected Pres. Pro. Tempore of the Senate. Dennison, o£. cit., p. 99. 1*6. Cong. R ec., f>l* Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1886. 79 do."^7 A few months previously he wanted to "seize and hold Cuba against the world." In the meantime the revolutionists were taking advantage of the American sympathy for their cause by sending filibustering expeditions from American shores. Although American vigilance succeeded in stopping about two-thirds of these endeavors the Spanish charged that United States' assistance alone was keeping the revolt alive.Spain diligently checked vessels for contraband and as is inevitable in such cases made errors. One such error involved the American vessel Alliance. The Alliance was on route from Colon, Columbia, and upon entering the Caribbean Sea was pursued by a Spanish search vessel. The Spanish ship fired on the Alliance and though no shot reached its tark9 get the incident inflamed American opinion. Many newspapers immediately demanded punitive measures and some called for annexation of Cuba. Godkin of the Nation opposed this emotional outburst and said of Frye, "War for war's sake has no warmer friend."'’® Frye was reported to have regretted the peaceful solution of the Allianca affair and to have preferred war. A s a matter of fact, Frye opposed American interception of any of the filibustering expeditions. It made him "weary and heartsick" to see the United States doing "police duty for 1*7. Ibid., p. 221*9. 1*8. Orestes Farrara, The Last Spanish War, (New York: Paisley Press, 1937), p. 36. 1*9. Joseph Wisan, The Cuban Crises as Reflected in the New York Press, (New York: Columbia University Press., 193ii), PP. 70-71. 50. Nation, January 30, 1896, p. 28. 80 the most wicked despotism ... on e a r t h . A n d if his position remained in doubt, he caused all speculation to cease by declaring, "I shall do or say or vote anything, consistent with honor and integrity -- which shall promote the success of the Cuban patriots who are -— struggling to wrest liberty from the iron grasp of a cruel and ref>2 lentless despotism.” As the election of 1896 approached, free Cuba subsided and into the vacuum came "free silver." Frye was being mentioned as a VicePresidential candidate and McKinley was reported as saying Frye was his choice, l i n e ' s eyes, however, were on Tom Reed who was seeking the Republican nomination for President. Neither Frye nor Reed achieved success. The Vice-Presidency went to Garret Hobart of New Jersey. /Frye*s daughter married Hobart's sonJ Frye gave his usual amount of speeches but did not command the headlines as he once had. His efforts were centered against the free silverites, but it appears that even this issue did not inspire him 53 too greatly. When Congress convened in December of 1896, Cleveland was a "lame duck" and Republican hopes for expansion had resumed its old vigor. No sooner had William McKinley taken office than his Republican colleagues in the Senate began to needle him to lead the Republican forces in an attempt to annex Hawaii. On March 15, 1897, Frye had 51. Cong. R ec., 5U cong., 1 Sess., p. 22li9. 52. •‘■bid. 53. Frye was disgusted at the intraparty strife over the silver question and did not want to go to the extreme for gold. Richardson, o p . cit., p. 519. 81 seen the President and apparently received encouragement for this plan. Earlier in February, Frye had advocated a $100,000 ^>propriation for the improvement of Pearl Harbor with hopes of increasing Hawaiian dependency on the United States. Some papers assailed him for this proposal and one called him a "pirate and a common thief" claiming that Captain Kidd had used the same methods. He did not want to improve the harbor but rather to claim an American act of sovereignty there.^ In short, Frye was using the technique of "dollar diplomacy" before the term originated twenty years later. In Cuba the situation was worsening. Spanish attempts to alleviate the tension had failed.^ As new outbreaks of violence occurred, Fitzhugh Lee, American consul-general in Havana, asked that ships be made ready in the event destruction of American property and lives took place. However, he assured his superior that they would not be needed at that time. Despite this assurance by Lee, the battleship Maine was ordered to Havana January 2h, 1898. Public enthusiasm was at a fever pitch. Yellow journalists were reporting the Cuban news and when there was no news to report, they invented some. Hundreds of prominent citizens were giving speeches for Cuban independence or annexation. Frye's every utterance had a Cuban complex. He spoke at many meetings of national organizations and enumerated Spanish abuses while calling for intervention. 50 5ii. Pratt, 0£. cit., p. 216. 55. Nation, February 11, 1897, p. U7. 56. Pratt, 0£. cit.. pp. 200-225. 57. Ib id . 58. Wisan, 0£. cit.. p. 230. 82 In all the furor over Cuba, i’rye did not forget Hawaii. He addressed the Manufacturers Association of New York in February 1898, and urged those present to exercise their influence upon the Senate for annexation of Hawaii. If they did not, they surely would lose the 59 Hawaiian market. In January, he had been quoted as wanting to "seize" Hawaii so that other interested nations could not annex t h e m , ^ and some Maine newspapers agreed with h i m . ^ While the Maine lay in Havana harbor an almost melodramatic incident occurred in the United States, the infamous de Lome Letter fiasco. In Maine, at least, people tended to blame no one but de Lome for his indiscretion, but as time went on this attitude changed to in62 volving Spain directly with the letter. No sooner had the de Lome furor subsided than the country went into a frenzy with the help of Heart's New York World. The Maine had blown up or had been blown up while it innocently lay at anchor! At first the Maine explosion was greeted with mixed emotions. Senator aale, Frye's compatriot from Maine, was certain that it was an accident and voiced his disapproval of extremists who clamored for war.^”* Congressman Boutelle, who owned an interest in the Bangor Whig and Courier, sponsored a measure which offered condolences to the 59. Nation, February 3, 1898, p. 80. 60. K.J., January 6, 1898, p. 2. 61. Lewiston Journal, January 6, 1898; K.J., January 7, 1898; Bangor Whig and Courier, February 11, 1898, p. 2. 62. Bangor Whig and Courier, February 11, 1898, p. 1 63. Ibid., February 17, 1898, p. 1. 83 families of those who lost their lives on the Maine. ^ Boutelle was opposed to war being one of the three that refused to vote for the declaration of war in April, He felt the pressure from his constituents and publicly declared that "every Congressman had two or three newspapers in his district - most of them printed in red ink -- and shouting for blood.Despite these pressures, the Whig pleaded for 66 moderation and lamented the Congressional preparations for war. Fpye, as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had been close to the Cuban situation since 1895. Since 1896, the committee had been conducting investigations attesting to gain information about the insurgents. It continued its investigations by probing the cause of the Maine disaster. The committee had recently advocated intervention; its present investigation was essentially one to find further justification for intervention. Despite the fact that the official board of inquiry did not find Spain guilty of sabotage, Frye, as a member of the subcommittee questioned the witnesses with a manner suggesting that Spain had deliberately blown up the Maine. His subsequent actions and public statements indicated that his knowledge of Cuban affairs was based solely on his interrogation of the witnesses as a member of the subcommittee. The results of the subcommittee's investigation were embodied in a resolution, Frye concurring, proposing 6l±. Ibid. 65. Boston Herald, October 23, 1898. Quoted in Rhodes, The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations, p . 55. 66. B.W. and C ., February 2h, 1898, p. 1 8U the independence of C u b a . ^ Shortly after the report was issued, Senator Proctor of Vermont returned to Washington from a trip to Cuba where he had observed the revolution first hand. Proctor's report depicting Spanish brutality and maladministration, served only to accentuate the already bellicose atmosphere of the country. A decade later one unidentifiable source alleged that Frye had literally dragged Proctor from the Senate cloakroom to deliver this inflammatory speech. It was reported that Proctor did not want to give such a report because he realized the probable affects of such action. On March 29, Frye and Senator Rawlins introduced a "startling resolution" which was only a portent of the pressures to be applied to President McKinley during the next three weeks in an attempt to get the President to declare war, "Resolved, by the Senate and House of the Republic of the United States of America in Congress assembled that the independence of the Republic of Cuba be and the same is hereby declared, and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the land and naval forces of the United States of America to wage such a war to success. "68 Congressman Boutelle's Bangor Whig called this resolution ill-ad69 vised and censured Frye for his jingoism. Theodore Roosevelt, however, congratulated Frye on his aggressiveness but directed Frye to 70 "keep this note private." 67. Senate Reports, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. U58-5^9. 68. B.W. and C ., March 30, 1998, p. 1. 69. Ibid.. p. 1*. 70. biting Morison, ed., Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, (Cambridge: 85 As the days passed, Senator Frye continued to press for intervention. Reportedly he and three others visited President McKinley to urge the President to ask the Senate for a declaration of war imrae71 diately. Frye's belligerancy was not totally approved by his Maine constituents. Leading Portland businessmen sent Frye a letter endorsing McKinley's policy of watchful waiting but the Senator continued to assure the men that the Foreign Relations Committee would "do noth72 ing rashly.'" Less than a week later the Portland Press reminded Frye that the cause of the Maine's destruction was undetermined and the reasons for a war with Spain were ill-defined. Therefore, it urged a reconsideration of the whole attitude toward war Business, in general, opposed w a r . ^ This is a likely explanation why Senator Hale supported McKinley's policy, and clearly explains nd Mark Hanna's opposition to war. '3 Frye had consistently agreed with Hanna and other business leaders on Republican economic programs. It is difficult to explain, therefore, why Frye at this time should pursue such an independent course. In Maine, Senators were still elected by the legislature which had traditionally been controlled by commercial and industrial interests. Harvard Press, 195l), Vol. 2, p. 806. 71. B.W. and C ., March 31, 1898, p. 2. 72. Ibid.. April 1 , 1898, p. 1 . 73. Quoted in B.W. and C.. April 5, 1898, p. 2. 7k. Julius Pratt, Hispanic American Historical Review. "American Business and the Spanish American War," XlV, No. 2, pp. 161*-178. 75. Herbert Croly. Marcus Alonzo Hanna. (New York; MacMillan Co.. 1923), p. 271*. 8 6 On April ill, the Foreign Relations Committee's resolution demanding independence or war was introduced by Frye; the Senate was in pandemonium.' The Teller Amendment was quickly passed to discourage imperial designs of annexation but not without words from Frye who wished to leave the disposition of Cuba until a later date. It is clear 77 that he desired annexation rather than the independence of Cuba. 1 Finally, April 19, 1898, Congress passed a joint resolution that was tantamount to a declaration of war on Spain. Frye voted for the resolution while Hale and Boutelle voted against it. The Whig praised Boutelle for his courage in opposing such drastic action and praised the "State of Maine" which it said had cut "a very creditable figure throughout the Cuban controversy ... excepting ... the jingoistic 7fi tendencies of Senator Frye." This was, indeed, mild talk compared to Frye's speech of April 19, which spearheaded the final vote for war. Lamenting the indecisiveness of Congress, he called for prompt action. "I have been silent all through this discussion because I wanted action, now for God's sake let us do something to relieve those poor people in Cuba. I believe that if we act now within ten days, Cuba will be free; provisions will be there for the starving and if not our guns will be thundering at Morro Castle."79 These are contradictory words from a man who, three years before, had risen to "true statesmanship" after the Allianca incident by saying: 76. London Times, April lit, 1898, 3:1. Quoted in Baily, op. cit.. p. 509. 77. Cong. Rec.. 55 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 3791. 73. B.W. and C .. April 17, I898, p. It. 79. Ibid.. April 19, 1898, p. It. 87 "I had almost hoped that Spain would assume such an arrogant and belligerent tone that it would be necessary for the United States to round out our possessions as they should be, and if we cannot buy it, I for one should like gq to have an opportunity to acquire it by conquest." Shortly after war was officially declared, Frye paid a visit to Secretary of the Navy Long, a Maine native, asking for vessels to protect the coast of Maine from Spanish ships. Long regarded this request 81 as an imposition and apparently did not act on it. The request, in retrospect, seems little more than ridiculous since Spain's fleet was pathetically small and inefficient; besides, it had all it could handle in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Again, a rather obvious inconsistency arises when one compares Frye's fear of attack and his earlier statement that Cuba would be free in ten days, implying that Spain was militarily destitute. The atmosphere generated by the war had succeeded in raising Americanism to heights not unlike most wars. Hawaiian annexation had been blocked for years because in peacetime a more diverse public opinion was tolerated. Now, however, the time was right except for one obstacle, Thomas B. Reed. Reed had never liked Frye nor did he agree on many issues with him. Reed, as chairman of the Committee on Rules of the House, controlled the consideration of a Hawaiian annexation bill. For three weeks against unbearable pressures from both public 80. Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. 1931), p. 29. 81. Lawerence Mayo, ed., America of Yesterday, Journal of John D . Long. (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1923), p. 185. 8 8 O n opinion and his Republican colleagues, Reed blocked this bill.1 Finally on July 6, I898, nawaii was annexed and Frye rejoiced to see one of his long sought proposals become a reality. A precedent for expansion beyond the continental boundaries had been established. The "boy scout war" was short-lived. % August the outcome was sure, if a doubt had ever existed. Would the United States follow the Hawaiian precedent by annexing Cuba and the Philippines? President McKinley appointed his peace commission in the middle of August. Three members of the Foreign Relations Committee were selected, Frye, Davis, and Gray. Whitelaw Reid, editor of the Mew York Tribune, and Secretary of State Day completed the commission. Only Senator Gray, a Democrat, Q O was known to be an anti-imperialist.0-5 Frye was reluctant to serve as a peace commissioner and if he had known that Senator Davis preferred Theodore Roosevelt to him, he might never have gone to Paris. Official negotiations began in Paris October 1, 1898, and the treaty was signed on December 10. Nearly a month was consumed discussing the delicate Cuban question. On October 31, the vexing and perplexing Philippine question came under discussion. United States policy regarding the Philippines had not been established by a formal statement. President McKinley had stated that he would accept no less 82. Pratt (1898), pp. 315-325. 83. N.Y.T., August 27, I898. Frye was labeled a jingo and an expansionist. QU. Thomas Beer, Hanna, (New York: A. Knopf, 1929), p. 208. 8 9 than Luzon.^ At first, Frye's position was vague. In an interview before going to Paris he stated that Puerto Rico and the Ladrone Islands must be annexed by the United States. To a question asking him if he would demand more than Luzon and Manila he replied, "there are other islands in the Philippines that are valuable. The commissioners can, you 86 understand, exact whatever trade benefits they wish." After a meeting with the other commissioners in President McKinley's office, he and Davis talked about dividing the islands; only Reid wished to take ft 7 the entire archipelago.0 A t Paris, both Fiye and Davis joined Reid 88 , in demanding the cession of the entire Philippine Islands. Why he changed his mind remains a mystery. It was, no doubt, this fact which helped to change President McKinley's original demand of just Luzon to demand that all the islands were to be taken (with the help of Divine Providence, of course). The Spanish commissioners balked at American demands for the entire Philippine Islands and negotiations broke down. At this juncture, Senator Frye made one of the most important moves of the entire deliberations. He sent a telegram to President Cleveland via Mr. A. A. Adee (State Department aide) informing him of the precariousness of the negotiations. He warned that Spain had already conceded all that her 85. Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 905-907. 86. Lewiston Journal, August 25 or 26, 1898, p. ? 87. Pratt, ojo. cit.. p. 332. 88. U.S. Foreign Relations, 1898, (Washingtons G.P.O., 1899), pp. 932- 933 • 9 0 people would possibly accept; so could not the United States offer Spain a slight inducement which would placate the Spanish people while gaining America's desired ends? "Might we not agree to pay Spain from $10,000,000 to $20,000,000 if thus a treaty could be secured? If no treaty then war, a continued disturbance of business, an expenditure of a million dollars a day, and further loss of l i f e -- If war is resumed, I hope orders will be given to seize at once all of the Philippine Islands, also the Carolines.1' ^ Two days later, Secretary of State John Hay called Frye to proceed with the negotiations along the lines proposed in Frye's telegram* If money would save a treaty then use money but do not sacrifice na90 tional honor were Hay's instructions . The remainder of the negotiations proceeded on this basis. Spain, toward the end of the deliberations, desired free entry into Philippine ports if the islands were to be given to the United States. Frye emphatically opposed t h i s r e - . 91 quest. B y the terms of the treaty Spain ceded the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam to the United States. Cuba was to become free from Spanish sovereignty. The final settlement provided that Spain receive $20,000,000 in exchange for the Philippines.^ The commissioners returned to the United States and were met with a mixed reception. After reading Frye's account of the proceedings in 89. Ibid., p. 939. Frye to Adee. October 30, 1898, Sunday midni ”
SUMMARY
Senator William P. Frye was called the following names:
1. pirate
2. buccaneer
3. jingo
-
a vociferous supporter of policy favoring war, especially in the name of patriotism."the feverish excitement of the jingo crowds"
Hawaiian Kingdom Facts: Lies by Aliens Revealed 71 years ...
Dr. Alfred DeZayas 2nd Letter to Routhe Bolomet - IOLANI ...
U.S. President Cleveland gave Hawaii Back to Queen Liliuokalani in 1893, 1894, and 1897. Ten U.S. President
Therefore, Pirate Buccanneer, Jingo William P. Frye supported lies, fraud, deceptions with U.S. President William McKinley who created a non-Sovereign government which supported the usurpation of Queen Liliuokalani in 1893 disregarding the facts that U.S. President Cleveland Hawaii back to her.
Note: see below for corrected information ---there was NO ANNEXATION!
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Reference:
Note: see below for corrected information ---there was NO ANNEXATION!
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